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Abstract: When designing a national public procurement system, the degree of 
centralization (or, equivalently, the degree of demand aggregation) is one of the most 
crucial as well as puzzling policy choices. Centralized procurement has been traditionally 
considered as an instrument to reduce public spending. In more recent years, though, 
and particularly after the 2008 global financial turmoil, a growing interest has arisen 
among both policy makers and researchers in government procurement as a lever to 
pursue broader policy goals, such as competitive markets structure, sustainable 
development and innovation. This paper reviews and discusses several issues related 
both to the rationales and to the practical implementation of centralized procurement 
strategies, with a particular focus on the procurement of goods and services. 
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1 Why Centralizing Public Procurement Strategies? 
Cost control is definitely a key issue in public (and private) 
procurement. Everywhere, Governments are increasingly urged to rein 
back public spending. This is very often done by rationalizing public 
expenditure for goods and services, which account for a considerable 
amount of resources. Being generally perceived as ‚politically less 
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sensitive‛ than pensions or health expenditure, public spending for goods 
and services becomes almost naturally the target of cost-controlling 
policies. 
Demand aggregation or centralized public procurement, when 
appropriately designed, may help reduce purchasing costs considerably.1 
This is why, all over the world, in many countries governments have 
resorted to a certain degree of centralization2  and charged a governmental 
agency with aggregating public demand and implementing centralized 
procurement strategies. GSA in the US, OGC and OGC Buying Solutions 
in the UK, PPS in Korea, ChileCompra in Chile, Hansel in Finland, BBG in 
Austria, Consip in Italy are just some examples of central purchasing 
agencies.3 
In addition, while the financial dimension remains crucial, governments 
agencies are usually willing to exchange better (resp., worse) financial 
conditions with lower (resp., higher) quality standards. Thus, it has 
become a commonly held view that a wider objective for public 
procurement – regardless of the degree of centralization – consists in the 
achievement of the highest possible quality-price ratio, also known as 
value for money. 
Yet, although still quite common, this is just a narrow view of the 
goal(s) pursued by centralized procurement processes. In fact, the concept 
of value for money can be widened so as to encompass benefits accruing 
                                                 
1 A discussion on some main rationales of centralization of procurement is carried out by 
Dimitri et al. (2006a). 
2 It is worth emphasizing that measuring and comparing the degree of centralization of 
public procurement in different countries is a very troublesome task, even if we restrict 
our attention to the value of public procurement of goods and services only. Intuitively, 
the degree of centralization could be easily expressed as the share of the volume of 
transactions realized by/via a central purchasing body (or bodies) over the total 
government spend in goods and services. Yet, in many countries the latter is very 
difficult to determine. This is due both to the organization of the state (think about 
federal states) and to the national accounting systems (for instance, usually public 
procurement expenditure covers both a fraction of the intermediate consumption and a 
fraction of capital investments). Moreover, one should notice that even those transactions 
realized by/via central purchasing bodies might not have a uniquely determined value in 
terms of centralization. For instance, transactions could consist of purchase orders issued 
under ‚highly centralized‛ framework contracts. However, they could also be generated 
by contracts awarded under framework agreements where the contracting authorities 
have large leeway of action, or by purchases autonomously made by the contracting 
authorities on a national e-procurement system managed by the central purchasing body. 
A ballpark estimate of the share of central purchasing body’s transactions volume over 
the total government spend in goods and services would be in a range between about 5% 
of Italy and other EU countries with similar state structure and about 40% of South 
Korea. 
3 The relevance of centralized procurement agencies is emphasized by Carpineti et al. 
(2006). 
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to the whole society rather than to the final users of the procured 
good/service/work only. 
In this sense, it is now fairly recognized by both the academic literature 
and policy makers that a (centralized) procurement strategy can be 
employed as a powerful lever in order to target broader policy goals. A 
typical example is provided by the European Union, which has always 
considered public procurement as one of key tools to pursue a true 
unification of the internal market4 and, in more recent years, to reach 
innovation and environmental sustainability targets.5 In the US, 
government procurement has always played a relevant role in boosting 
innovation and, more recently, protecting disadvantaged social categories 
such as veterans, ethnical minorities, women, and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). 
Another interesting example is provided by governments’ reaction to 
face the recent financial and economic crisis. In countries whose economy 
is characterized by large public debts (e.g. Italy, Greece), the procurement 
lever has been increasingly invoked by the governments in order to 
control and reduce public expenditures. Conversely, countries like US and 
China have tackled the crisis by implementing large economic stimulus 
policies aimed at sustaining market demand and innovation. A relevant 
share of such stimulus packages heavily relies on public procurement. 
To be sure, public procurement, rather than an instrument to merely 
control public spending, can be seen as a powerful economic and 
industrial policy tool. Indeed, in many sectors public demand accounts for 
a sizeable share of the total market demand. When this demand is 
aggregated, say through the action of a central purchasing agency, the 
central public buyer is endowed with a relevant market power and is in a 
position to play an important role, so as to affect the market structure, give 
important signal to the supply market and point the way for development 
and innovation. 
In the next sections, we will go through an analysis of the circumstances 
under which centralized procurement may yield cost reduction to public 
administration. In doing that, though, we will not neglect to point out 
some mechanisms which risk to hamper the objective of spending control. 
In section 3, we will sketch a brief outline of some relevant fields where 
centralization of public procurement can play a relevant role in pursuing 
policies going beyond ‚mere‛ value for money or, equivalently, the 
concept of value for money is extended so as to embed (possibly long-run) 
benefits accruing to the whole society. Though, as we will see, the public 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, European Commission (1985 and 2003). 
5 The two approaches, however, should be considered together as, for instance, in Monti 
(2010, pp. 76-78). 
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buyer is often called to trade-off between ‚immediate‛ value for money 
for public contracts users and social value of procurement strategies. 
Section 4 will be devoted to an analysis of one major tool for the 
centralization of public procurement, namely the Framework Agreements. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2 Centralized Public Procurement and Control of 
Public Spending 
Carefully designed centralized procurement strategies are able to 
reduce the total cost of public purchases, both by achieving lower 
purchasing prices and by streamlining the acquisition processes, so 
reducing transaction cost. This is mainly due to the interaction among 
several forces: 
 Production economies of scale and increased bargaining power of 
the contracting authority. 
 Optimization of the procurement process via specialization, 
information and know-how sharing, investments in (mainly ICT) 
infrastructures (e-procurement tools). 
2.1 Production Economies of Scale and Bargaining Power  
The more standardized the product/service the more potentially 
advantageous to the buyer to aggregate demand, since suppliers are in a 
position to exploit economies of scale, thus operating at a lower unit cost. 
Economies of scale arise whenever production costs comprise a sizeable 
fraction of fixed costs, that is, of costs that are independent of the 
production scale. By increasing production firms are able to operate at a 
lower unit cost. 
The dimension of product standardization is sometimes hard to 
disentangle from the degree of demand heterogeneity. To see this, 
consider a very simple case of procurement of gasoline. This might be 
considered a highly standardized commodity, but contracting authorities 
may differ in their preferences about delivery conditions, time of payment, 
physical location, consumption profiles, contract management skills, 
degree of freedom in budget and accounting management. Were this the 
case, seemingly similar procurement contracts would end up being 
different ‚objects‛. This implies that commodity standardization – or, 
better, contract standardization – should also be coupled with a low 
degree of demand heterogeneity for aggregation to deploy its full 
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potential.6 When this is the case, demand aggregation generally allows 
firms to produce at a lower unit cost. 
Lower production costs, however, may yield lower purchasing prices 
only if the buyer keeps intact or increases its bargaining power. The 
degree of competition is usually expected to increase with the value of 
procurement contracts. Particularly in markets where the public sector 
accounts for a relevant share of the total demand, centralization, 
standardization and aggregation can put the winner of a single 
competitive tendering in a position to significantly increase its market 
share. This strengthens the bargaining power of the public agency 
awarding the contract, so leading the suppliers to compete more fiercely to 
offer lower price and better quality. 7 
Yet, two conflicting forces come into play. For a given number of 
competitors, demand aggregation leads to fiercer competition. However, 
as the size of contracts gets larger, smaller firms may find it impossible to 
participate in the competitive processes – because of more demanding 
economic and financial requisites – thus leading to a lower number of 
competitors. Assuming that in most circumstances the lower participation 
effect is not strong enough, demand aggregation usually leads to higher 
savings. 
2.2 Streamline Processes, Specialization, Knowledge and 
Information Sharing 
Centralization also allows economies of scale to arise when setting up 
procurement processes. On the one hand, this is simply due to the fact that 
when procurement contracts are fairly homogeneous, demand 
aggregation avoids the duplication of ‚transaction costs‛ that would arise 
if each purchasing unit were to conduct the procurement process on its 
                                                 
6 Buyers’ heterogeneity can heavily hamper the effectiveness of a fully centralized 
procurement strategy. Alternative approaches to deal with heterogeneity are discussed in 
section 4. In addition, other drawbacks of demand aggregation could stem from the 
supply side of the market. This is discussed in section 3.1. 
7 It should be noticed, however, that tougher competition in the tendering process might 
just increase the value for money ‚promised‛ by tenderers. Yet, the effective quality of 
the delivered product or service and, hence, the effective value for money accruing to the 
buyer, also strongly depend on the buyer’s contract management skills and effort. A 
good contract management could consist, for instance, in properly monitoring the 
contractor’s performance, checking her compliance with the contract clauses and, where 
it is the case, charging the contractor with the penalties provided for in the contract. 
Regardless of the goodness of contract terms and conditions, an improper contract 
management does not provide the contractor with the right incentives to perform well. 
For a technical analysis of optimal procurement contracting see, for instance, Laffont and 
Tirole (1993) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2004). Albano et al. (2006b) provide a general, 
non-technical discussion on procurement contracting strategies. 
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own and competing firms were to submit distinct offers for each 
procurement process. On the other hand, economies of scale also concern 
the overall process cost of procurement activities, as central agencies are in 
a position to bear the fixed cost of investments in infrastructures. A major 
example in this sense is provided by e-procurement tools, which typically 
require large investments in both hardware and software IT systems. 
Many central procurement agencies make available to all the contracting 
authorities e-procurement platforms and tools, possibly allowing them to 
manage all the phases of the acquisition processes (such as information 
collection, publication and management of competitive tendering, issuing 
of purchase orders). It is widely recognized that e-procurement is able to 
yield process cost savings as well as better value for money (for instance, 
from enlarged procurement market, reduced barriers to entry for the 
firms, improved transparency, eased data and information collection for 
both contracting authorities and suppliers8). 
But some further (less frequently mentioned) factors related to 
centralization can lead to streamline processes. Large organizations are 
usually characterized by high degree of specialization of human capital 
while, at same time, producing lots of information. Knowledge-sharing is 
recognized to be a key (positive) externality arising within the boundaries 
of such organizations. In general, information sharing improves efficiency 
via the use of more up-to-date data/information, problem-sharing and 
common solutions.9 Moreover, seemingly different markets are often 
connected (e.g., printers and PCs, insurance and banking, etc.), since major 
competitors turn out to be multi-product firms. For instance, computer 
producers as Siemens, HP, IBM – as well as retailers of their products - 
participate in procurement competitive tendering for desktop PCs but also 
for laptops. IBM can also bid for mainframes, data warehousing, and other 
IT services contracts. 
Because of neighbouring markets, procurements officials would 
certainly benefit from information and knowledge-sharing so as to find 
solutions to common problems – e.g. the choice of appropriate 
procurement strategy, scoring rules,10 contractual arrangements. 
Consequently, the higher the level of centralization the more information, 
                                                 
8 As regarding data availability, a remarkable best practice is provided by the platform of 
ChileCompra (Chile), which makes a large data base, including data on all the 
acquisitions of all the national contracting authorities, available online to all citizens. 
9 See section 3.2.8 in Dimitri et al. (2006b) and related references. 
10 Scoring rules are mathematical algorithms employed in order to score and compare 
different (both financial or technical) aspects of tender proposals. The design of scoring 
rules critically affects the incentives provided to the competitors when a contract is 
awarded with the most economically advantageous tender criterion. An overview of the 
most commonly used scoring rules is provided by Dini et al. (2006). 
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knowledge and data can be shared among procurement specialists. This 
also applies to legal expertise, in that gathering qualified resources dealing 
with sizeable procurement processes tends to improve the clearness, 
transparency and measurability of the formal requirements, i.e., overall 
‚quality‛ of tender documents, which in turn translates into a lower risk 
of legal suits. 
Finally, it is important to remark that a major critical issue about 
centralized procurement concerns with information gathering. In fact, 
central purchasing bodies are usually in charge of designing and 
awarding large contracts to supply many (and possibly heterogeneous) 
public agencies. This requires a lot of information to estimate final buyers’ 
needs and preferences, which is also crucial to reduce the degree of 
uncertainty faced by the firms bidding for public contracts. This task is as 
costly as complex, so mistakes in the demand analysis and estimation may 
result harmful for the procuring agencies as well as for the suppliers. The 
concern for demand heterogeneity will be analyzed in more details in 
section 4. 
3 From Cost Control to (Social) Value for Money  
So far the discussion has provided an admittedly narrow view to the 
goal(s) pursued by centralized procurement processes. The ability of 
centralized procurement to pursue objectives laying beyond simple price 
reduction stems from several considerations. Firstly, public procurement 
policies may have a relevant impact on the market structure insofar as the 
award of large centralized public contracts is likely to affect the 
distribution of the market shares of the economic operators. 
Secondly, the government is often called to deal with public goods 
and/or operate in markets where externalities are well known to play a 
crucial role. In principle, such externalities can be efficiently internalized, 
in the interest of the whole society, both through regulatory actions 
(setting of standards, rules and policies targets) or through direct 
management of acquisition initiatives (large government projects and 
investments, centralized procurement strategies). 
3.1 Effects on the Market Structure 
Aggregating public demand may have a considerable impact on firms’ 
market shares and, consequently, on the relevant market structure. This 
effect is bigger the higher the share of public demand is awarded by 
centralized strategies. The most immediate concern relates to the potential 
difficulties SMEs may face in accessing the procurement market since 
sizeable procurement contracts would bring about more stringent 
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economic requirements, thus limiting SMEs participation in centralized 
competitive processes. Another concern, not less worrisome, is the risk of 
the buyer’s being locked in by a dominant supplier, which translates into a 
reduction of the degree of competition over time. 
There exists nonetheless an attractive solution striking a balance 
between demand aggregation (instrumental to raise the buyer’s 
bargaining power) and allowing participation of both large firms and 
SMEs, namely splitting a procurement contract into several lots and/or 
softening the constraints for joint bidding.11 Furthermore, if 
complementarities arise among different lots - say, because of sizeable 
common fixed costs – then allowing firms to submit package bids may 
become efficiency enhancing.12  
The risk of lock-in refers, instead, to the repeated (i.e. dynamic) feature 
of public procurement.13 Indeed, there exist circumstances under which 
raising the degree of competition today is likely to reduce the degree of 
competition tomorrow. This implies that the public buyer should not only 
pay attention to the short run, i.e., the degree of competition in the current 
tender, but also at the long run, namely competition for contracts in the 
future. One solution to this tension is to split the procurement contract in 
multiple lots and to fix an upper limit to the number of lots that each firm 
can be awarded. Such an awarding constraint forces the number of 
awardees to be greater than one, so that the degree of potential 
competition for future contracts is preserved by giving up some 
competition for current contracts. 
Another solution is the ‚split-award tendering process‛,14 whereby each 
firm submits bids for a share of the contract as well as for a sole source 
award. The contract is awarded to the best offer for the whole supply (sole 
source) or to the combination of the two ‘partial’ offers (dual sourcing). 
The buyer may choose the solution that i) minimizes the procurement 
price or ii) favours either bundling or separate sales. 
This procedure ensures that more than one firm has a chance to 
improve its technical skills while carrying out the contract. Thus, 
competition in future tendering processes remains relatively high. An 
alternative strategy to avoid lock-in is to rotate suppliers. As a 
consequence, several firms can improve upon their technical skills while 
carrying out supply contracts, which in turn maintains competition 
intense in the long run. 
                                                 
11 An economic analysis of regulation of joint bidding in public procurement is carried 
out by Albano et al. (2009). 
12 For more on use of package bidding in public procurement, see Dimitri et al. (2006b). 
13 A compulsory reading is Lewis and Yildirim (2006) (and references therein). 
14 See Anton and Yao (1989). 
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3.2 Centralized Procurement and Innovation 
Innovation ultimately relies on production and diffusion of new 
knowledge, which can be seen as a public good exerting positive 
externalities on the whole economy.15 A simple economic argument would 
provide the main rationale for public intervention in the innovation 
market. 
A discussion about the public good nature of innovation goes far 
beyond the scope of this work.16 Yet, it is fairly evident that almost all 
governments do commonly implement policies aimed at promoting 
innovation at different levels and through different instruments. Many of 
them are based on directly supporting and sustaining the ‚producers‛ of 
innovation (‚market push‛ approach): from infrastructures building (say 
national high education systems) to subsidies to R&D activities. 
On the other hand, innovation can also be boosted by acting on the 
demand side of the market (‚market-pull‛ approach). In this sense the 
public demand, if managed through strategic public procurement 
strategies, can play an important role insofar as large-scale government 
purchases can be oriented toward goods with different R&D content. For 
instance, the crucial role of US defense acquisitions in triggering or 
boosting innovation in sectors like transports, ICT, electronics, new 
materials is widely recognized.17 
The major advantage of the ‚market-pull‛ approach is that it requires 
less information than the ‚market-push‛ one. In the economic literature, 
such ideas have been outlined, for instance, by Geroski (1990), Dalpé 
(1994) and Edler and Georghiou (2007). All of them emphasize how the 
effectiveness of a demand-based approach to innovation policy stems 
from several facts. First, procurement initiatives can make R&D projects to 
be driven by actual and clearly defined needs of the government. As a 
consequence, procurement-based innovation policies can target the results 
of the R&D activity from the final user’s perspective, rather than through 
an ‚external‛ evaluation of technical or scientific achievements. Secondly, 
public demand, especially when aggregated, is able to provide those firms 
developing new products and processes with an assured market whose 
size may be as relevant as to cover the risk of large investments typically 
related with R&D. Thirdly, it has been noticed that, in many cases, the 
creation of a public market for new products can trigger a ‚flywheel 
                                                 
15 This idea dates back at least to Arrow (1962). 
16 More detailed discussion and further references on the relationship between 
procurement and innovation are presented by Cabral et al. (2006) or Edler et al. (2005). 
Scotchmer (2004) provides a discussion on the economics of innovation. For a critique of 
the view of knowledge as a public good, see Boldrin and Levine (2005). 
17 More examples and related references are provided by Cabral et al. (2006). The EU 
Project OMC-PTP (2009) provides a list of cases on recent experiences in the EU. 
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effect‛ for the rise of a private market. This spillover effect is relevant, in 
particular, for markets characterized by ‚network effects‛, i.e. markets for 
products whose value for customers increases with the number of their 
users.18 Finally, even beyond stimulating production of innovative goods, 
the public sector is in a position to set forward (or even switch) the 
dominant standard for commonly used products and processes. 
3.2.1 Procurement of Innovation 
In recent years, the European Commission (EC) has identified the direct 
procurement of innovation, say in the form of R&D projects, as ‚a missing 
link‛ in the European production chain of innovation, especially in 
comparison with the US. The direct acquisition of innovative solutions is 
also known as pre-commercial procurement.19  
In invoking a more intensive strategic use of pre-commercial (public) 
procurement, the EC has pointed out that the acquisition of R&D projects 
lays outside of the scope of the Directive with the exception of cases where 
‚the benefits accrue exclusively to the contracting authority for its use in 
the conduct of its own affairs, on condition that the service provided is 
wholly remunerated by the contracting authority‛.20 Needless to say, such 
a constraint is likely to restrain the European public agencies from direct 
acquisition of innovation, insofar as it prevents firms from commercial 
exploitation of the achieved results on the private markets, thus increasing 
the expected cost for the public buyer. In addition, it is fairly 
understandable that governments would like to stimulate innovation from 
national firms, which is made difficult by both the EU law and 
international trade agreements, that forbid State-aids. 
In order to fill the gap, the EC has issued the Communication ‚Pre-
commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high 
quality public services in Europe‛.21 The document sketches a suitable 
model for innovation-targeted strategic use of public procurement, 
compatible with both the EU law and the international trade agreements, 
such as the WTO Government Purchase Agreement. 
                                                 
18 See Katz and Shapiro (1985). 
19 By pre-commercial solution it is meant the original development of a first product or 
service. The WTO Government Purchase Agreement (Art. XV) points out that this ‚may 
include limited production or supply in order to incorporate the results of field testing 
and to demonstrate that the product or service is suitable for production or supply in 
quantity to acceptable quality standards". 
20 EU Directive 2004/18, Art. 16. 
21 See the EU Communication 2007/799 on Pre-commercial procurement. This document 
is also based on a study commissioned by the EC, (National IST Directors Forum 
Working Group, 2006). 
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The proposed approach is based on two clearly distinct phases.22 The 
object of the first phase is the acquisition of R&D services only. It basically 
consists of a sort of multi-stage ‚R&D contest‛23 aimed at developing a 
pre-commercial solution in response of a concrete need or problem. The 
model of this phase is based on (i) distinct competitive stages with 
sequential selection of a lower and lower number of projects, remunerated 
at each stage by with a cost-reimbursement approach; (ii) sharing of both 
risks and benefits of the R&D between the buyer and the competitors – for 
instance, through careful allocation of the generated IPRs, (iii) avoiding 
State-aids. The second phase, in turn, is the ‚commercial‛ one, and 
consists in a ‚standard‛ procurement tendering procedure in order to 
acquire off-the-shelf products or services. Hence, it can take place in the 
frame of the procurement Directive. Of course, the results of the R&D 
activity of the first phase can be embedded in the finally procured 
contract. 
3.2.2 Procurement for Innovation 
Beyond the direct procurement of innovative projects, the government 
is in a position to target its purchasing activity to stimulate production 
and diffusion of innovation in several other indirect ways.24 
To this end, a possible strategy may concern the design of competitive 
tendering processes and, in particular, how requirements, requisites and 
specifications are set in tender documents. Let us consider the case of a 
public buyer procuring a product or service in order to satisfy specific 
needs and solve specific problems. If the object of the contract to be 
awarded is described in the tender documents in terms of performance 
requirements and functional specifications rather than in terms of 
product/service technical specifications or standards, the competitors 
have both more incentive and more leeway to research the most efficient 
solution to address the needs expressed in the tender documents and 
fulfill contract requirements. 25,26 
In some sense, the same idea is also at the basis of the competitive 
dialogue, a new negotiation tool introduced in the EU law by the 2004 
                                                 
22 A more detailed description of the proposed model is provided by the European 
Commission (2007), in an accompanying document to the EU Communication 2007/799. 
23 Research contests and the adoption of auction mechanisms to select and reward the 
winners have been studied, among others, by Taylor (1995) and Fullerton et al. (2002). A 
simpler, less technical discussion is provided by Cabral et al. (2006). 
24 The interest of the EU for promoting innovation through public procurement is 
testified, for instance, in European Commission, (2005b), also known as the Wilkinson 
Report. For a more recent discussion, see EU Project OMC-PTP (2009). 
25 This strategy is also allowed by the EU Directive 2004/18. 
26 A more detailed discussion of functional specifications and their role in stimulating 
innovation is provided in European Commission (2005b). 
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Directive. Actually, the competitive dialogue is explicitly aimed at dealing 
with complex projects which require a careful research and development 
of the best solution to address specific procurer’s needs. Competitive 
dialogue is a flexible procedure which, while preserving competition 
between economic operators, also takes into account the need for the 
contracting authorities to discuss all aspects of the contract with each 
candidate. Though, competitive dialogue is not exempt from criticisms 
(Arrowsmith, 2006). 
To be sure, government procurement is also able to foster diffusion of 
innovative products throughout the public administration. When the size 
of such purchases is not negligible with respect to the overall size of the 
market or in markets where network effects play an important role, 
standardization of publicly procured goods/services can affect the 
dominant standard on the market.27 The strategic adoption of standards in 
the tender documents to stimulate innovation has been tackled by the EC 
by the STEPPIN project that lead to the drafting of a Handbook of policy 
guidelines.28 It should emphasized, however, that the role of 
standardization in fostering innovation is quite controversial (Allen and 
Sriram, 2000). 
3.3 Centralized Procurement and Sustainability 
The financial component of value for money ought not be simply the 
purchasing price of a certain good/service (or even a civil work), rather 
the life-cycle cost (LCC), that includes both operating costs (e.g., energy, 
spares and maintenance) and end-of-life costs (e.g., decommissioning and 
removal). Stretching the time horizon for evaluating the financial 
dimension(s) of the value for money may have at least two benefits: i) it 
makes all financial components more visible and transparent, thus 
allowing buyers to trade-off, say, a higher purchasing cost today with a 
lower maintenance cost tomorrow; ii) expenditures at different stages of 
the life-cycle are emphasized, thus allowing public buyers to better plan - 
whenever admissible by public accounting rules - budgetary predictions 
over several years. 
                                                 
27 On relationships between standardization and network effects, a seminal contribution 
is Katz and Shapiro (1985). See also Besen and Farrell (1994) and Gandal (2002). 
28 A web-based version of the Steppin Handbook (2008) is available at 
http://standards.eu-innova.org/Pages/Steppin/Tools.aspx.  A more comprehensive 
survey of the project is carried out by Apostol (2010). 
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The LCC approach for implementing Green Public Procurement (GPP) 
has become in recent years one of the pillars of the European 
Commission’s policy guidelines on public procurement.29 
The broad objective of GPP is to design procurement strategies so as to 
minimize the amount of negative externalities on the environment. To 
better clarify this objective, it would be useful to mention some of the 
main findings of a research project – called RELIEF30 – co-funded by the 
EC, aiming at scientifically assessing the potential environmental benefits 
of EU-wide green procurement strategies. The findings concluded that:  
 If all public authorities across the EU demanded green electricity, 
this would save the equivalent of 60 million tonnes of CO2, which is 
equivalent to 18% of the EU’s greenhouse gas reduction commitment 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Nearly the same saving could be achieved 
if public authorities opted for buildings of high environmental 
quality. 
 If all public authorities across the EU were to require more energy-
efficient computers, and this led the whole market to move in that 
direction, this would result in 830.000 tonnes of CO2 savings. 
 If all European public authorities opted for efficient toilets and taps 
in their buildings, this would reduce water consumption by 200 
million tonnes (equivalent to 0.6% of total household consumption in 
the EU). 
The findings just mentioned emphasize ‚social‛ benefits stemming 
from green procurement, that is, the reduction of negative externalities 
from lower CO2 and pollutants emissions or lower consumption of raw 
materials. Thus, under normal circumstances, procurement strategies with 
a positive (resp., negative) environmental impact are typically cases of 
positive (resp., negative) externalities. GPP strategies may also generate 
private benefits, accruing directly to the public buyer. In most cases they 
arise from future savings due, for instance, to lower consumption of 
energy or water or from lower waste or disposal cost. But sometimes there 
might be concerns about better or healthier working conditions for the 
employees, which might also result in lower risks for the employer. 
Some remarks are useful about this distinction. First of all, the two 
effects often coexist and are strongly related. Energy efficiency solutions, 
for instance, allow lower consumption yielding both lower operating 
expenditures for the buyer and lower pollution for the environment. In 
general, green purchasing accruing a private benefit for the buyer causes a 
                                                 
29 Plenty of information about the EU approach to GPP is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm. In particular, see European 
Commission (2004). 
30 For more on the RELIEF project see the  website (ICLEI, n.d.) www.iclei-europe.org . 
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positive externality for the environment as well. The converse is not 
always true, though. In some cases, green products might leave 
unchanged or even decrease the direct utility of the procurer. Consider, 
for instance, the use of recycled paper for printers, which has a lower 
environmental impact than bleached paper but brings no advantage to the 
users, either in terms of quality (which, on the contrary, may be perceived 
as lower) or in terms of costs (which may be higher). Another example is 
the procurement of products with low environmental impact at the 
production phase, which may result more costly without providing the 
user with any additional benefit. 
The EC’s guidelines seem to neglect this important distinction which, in 
turn, is likely to strongly affect the buyers’ willingness to pay for green 
products. In fact, it is clear that any buyer – be it either public or private 
buyer - might be willing to pay a higher purchasing price against future 
savings on usage and disposal. Indeed, private benefits can be fully 
internalised. But this is not the case for externalities: a buyer caring about 
her own utility only, will not be willing to pay an higher price in order to 
bring a positive externality (or avoid a negative one) to the society. Many 
in fact believe – or simply wishfully think – that a public administration 
should have strong social responsibility and so care about the 
environment in the interest of the whole society. Nevertheless, it is 
plausible that the preferences of any public administration and, more in 
particular, of public officials and policy makers are related to many 
complex factors that could prevail on the environmental impact of their 
decisions. As an example, one could just consider the case of many 
Countries reluctant to sign international agreements about global 
warming reduction. At a lower level, a local municipality might be 
scarcely interested in investing money in energy efficiency projects, 
because the pay-back period may exceed the political cycle, so it might 
prefer to allocate resources to different projects. 
The question is then to what extent some form of demand aggregation 
would be beneficial in consistently pursing GPP strategies. First, any 
‚small‛ public buyer – say, a local municipality – reaps only a tiny fraction 
of the overall reduction of negative externalities (CO2), so it is likely to be 
affected by a standard free-riding problem, that is, to underestimate the 
value it attaches to lower pollution.31 When demand of several public 
agencies is aggregated – for instance, by means of a central purchasing 
body – the overall value of lower externalities can be internalized by a 
                                                 
31 In fact, it should be noticed that some governments provide the contracting authorities 
with (either indicative or mandatory) values for the discount rates that should be 
adopted to evaluate and compare the return of investments on sustainable procurement 
initiatives. 
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single (framework) contract awarded on behalf of several final users. 
Demand aggregation may then become an effective tool to (almost) fully 
internalize social benefits. 
Secondly, demand aggregation could come into play as an important 
incentive for the economic operators to pursue innovation focused on 
environmental-friendly products and processes. In this sense, all the 
considerations carried out about the role of centralized procurement to 
stimulate innovation hold altogether. 
The third potential advantage of centralized strategy originates from 
the inability of a single public buyer to optimally solve the intertemporal 
budget planning. This stems from a couple of reasons, at least. 
Firstly, it should be noticed that solving the intertemporal trade-off 
between cheaper investments ‚today‛ and lower operating cost and/or 
benefit for the environment ‚tomorrow‛ (i) does necessarily require a LCC 
analysis which, in turn, (ii) implies to set the ‚optimal‛ discount rate to 
weight and value future benefits from GPP and estimate the return of 
related investments. All this requires a specialized know how that ‚small‛ 
public agencies are likely not to have access to. Secondly, it seems 
reasonable to assume a central purchasing agency to have a longer time 
horizon due, for instance, to the political cycle considerations mentioned 
above. This, in turn, implies that the discount rate set by a central agency 
may result closer to the ‚socially optimal‛ discount rate. 
Of course, defining the socially optimal discount rate is not easy at all32, 
also because here the distinction between private benefit and positive 
externalities (discussed above) plays an important role too. 
Indeed, a distinction should be made between the standard discount 
factor (also named "private rate") and the ‚social‛ one, the difference 
being that while the first just considers the market remuneration for 
monetary investments over the time, the second one also takes into 
account the social impact that this investment could weigh on social 
welfare. 
A fair amount of literature exists dealing with the concept of social 
discount rates and their relations with global warming and climate 
change. Seminal papers are by Dasgupta et al. (1999) and Dasgupta 
(2008)33. The main idea underlying these papers is that, when a public 
authority faces an intertemporal welfare maximization, it might be 
extremely hard today to evaluate environmental risks in the distant future. 
                                                 
32 Some governments or other institutions recommend (a range of) values for the discount 
rate to be used to estimate the net present value of GPP initiatives. For instance, the UK 
government suggests 3.5%, as shown in (UK, HM Treasury, 2003). Some considerations 
are also provided by the OECD (2003) and by the Öko Institut e.V. (2007). 
33 For further references on intertemporal public choice and climate change, see also 
Schelling (1992), Cowen and Parfit (1992) and Nordhaus (1994). 
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Dasgupta et al. (1999) argue that social discount rates have to be estimated 
by considering the institutional setting within which social cost benefit 
analysis is assumed to be undertaken. These rates are not necessarily 
positive, but even negative if investments imply environmental pollution 
(in any case, these rates would be strictly lower than the private rates). In 
the path of the climate change, Dasgupta (2008) maintains that, once one 
realizes that social discount rates are not observables and ethical 
primitives, they must be derived by accounting from economic forecasts 
and society's conception of distributive justice on intertemporal allocation 
of goods and services. 
4 Designing Centralized Procurement Through Two-
stage Processes 
Strong centralization can normally be implemented at some cost, 
mainly the risk of ‚loose tailoring‛ of public contracts to purchasing units’ 
needs. Several reasons may explain the so-called ‚demand heterogeneity‛: 
physical location (e.g., schools located on high mountains rather than in 
town, leading to different transportation costs); nature of the public 
service provided (Police Departments will put by far a stronger 
importance on cars’ maintenance than Inland Revenue); different bundles 
of the same commodities (in a contract for food raw materials, different 
public agencies may need vegetables and meat in different proportions); 
different customizations of the same products or need for different 
optional services; or simply intrinsic characteristics as buying entities 
(timeliness of payments, managerial skills in enforcing public contracts 
etc.). Heterogeneity may simply stem from purchases taking place at 
different points in time. For instance, technological obsolescence does 
affect, ceteris paribus, the performance of a laptop. Consequently, purchase 
orders of laptops belonging to the same broad family turn out to concern 
with substantially different commodities when the speed of the processor 
becomes higher and higher over time due to hardware evolution. 
In order to reconcile demand aggregation, contract tailoring and 
process streamlining, a flexible two-stage procedure could be designed 
whereby: 
 At the first stage, all or part of the terms of the contracts to be awarded 
are defined (framework agreement or master contract). 
 At the second stage (call-off), the actual contracts are awarded (specific 
contracts or purchasing orders). 
Without the ambition of being exhaustive, a two stage process may 
result useful in two kind of situations: repeated purchases by a single 
public agency and single/multiple purchases by different public agencies. 
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In both circumstances, the presence of a procurement agency may be 
envisaged, acting on behalf of other public authorities to conclude the 
framework agreement, that is, to draft the master contract. 
4.1 What are Framework Agreements? 
Framework agreements (henceforth, FAs) are anticipated arrangements 
for the delivery of goods and services over a certain period of time. 
According to both international practices and regulation, three broad 
definitions of FAs can be identified: 
 The European Union, in the procurement 2004 Directive, (EU) defines 
FAs as ‚agreements between one/more contracting agencies and 
economic operator(s) … to establish the terms governing contracts to 
be awarded during a given period … with regard to price and … the 
quantities envisaged.‛ 34 
 The United States of America have adopted different options such as: 
Government-Wide Acquisition Contracts (GWAC), Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts and Multiple Award 
Schedules (MAS) that imply multiple standing contracts with 
subsequent competition for task or delivery orders. 
 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) defines a FA as a transaction to secure the supply of a 
product or service over a period of time (periodic/recurrent 
purchase arrangement, periodic requirements arrangement, periodic 
supply vehicle). 
The three families are linked by two common traits: the aggregation of 
demand for goods and services to be delivered/provided at different 
moments in time; the adoption of a two-stage procurement process.35 In 
the following two sections, we will emphasize the potential benefits and 
risks from aggregating (not necessarily homogeneous) public demands, 
possibly originating from different purchasing units – be them offices 
within the same Department/Ministry rather than contracting authorities 
scattered over a certain territory – and those arising from a two-stage 
procurement process. 
In Europe, the evolution of regulation on public procurement in the last 
few years – together with a series of interpretations36 of the same 
regulation issued by the European Commission itself – has led 
                                                 
34 EU Directive 2004/18. The definition of FA is provided in the Art. 1(5). Art. 32 is 
entirely devoted to FAs. 
35 An insightful analysis of differences and common traits between the adoption of 
framework arrangements in Europe and in the US is provided by Yukins (2008). 
36 See, in particular, the Explanatory Note provided by the European Commission 
(2005a). 
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procurement officers and scholars alike to classify FAs according two 
major dimensions: i) the degree of completeness of the master contract; 
and ii) the number of economic operators with whom a FA is concluded. 
This would almost naturally lead to four classes of FAs as described in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Classification of Framework Agreements 
 Complete (all conditions established 
in the master contract) 
 Single award (one economic operator) 
 Incomplete (not all conditions 
established in the master contract) 
 Single award (one economic operator) 
 Complete (all conditions established 
in the master contract) 
 Multiple award (more than one 
economic operator, at least 3 in 
Europe) 
 Incomplete (not all conditions 
established in the master contract) 
 Multiple award (more than one 
economic operator, at least 3 in Europe) 
 
One immediate consequence of the above classification is that one is led 
to believe that whether a FA is complete or incomplete is hardwired in the 
master contract, that is, a FA is crafted either complete or incomplete. 
There exist, however, a more flexible approach to the design of the master 
contract which is currently advocated by the Office of Government 
Commerce37 in the UK whereby the FA may establish all the ‚core‛ 
conditions at the first stage – so as to make purchase orders immediately 
available – although some contractual clauses may be modified at a later 
stage where competition s reopened. Next sections will discuss more in 
details the most common classes of FAs.  
4.2 The Benchmark Case of Frame Contracts 
It is worth starting our analysis with the case of a FA concluded with 
one economic operator and all conditions established in the master 
contract. This kind of FA, also known as ‚frame contract‛ (FC) is very 
close to the centralized procurement strategy implemented by the Italian 
Public Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.) within the program of 
rationalization of public spending38. Public agencies, both at a central and 
                                                 
37 This approach is presented, for instance, in the Guidance on Framework Agreements 
(OGC, 2006). Available at 
http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/guide_20framework_agreements.pdf. 
38 For further information on Consip and its public procurement strategies, see 
www.consip.it and Broggi (2009). 
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local level, are entitled to make purchase orders from the FC awarded by 
the central procurement agency39. 
The main feature of a FC is that quality-price competition is entirely 
concentrated in the first stage, whereas the second stage, at which the 
specific contracts are awarded, is simply reduced to issuing of purchase 
orders. Hence, the main advantages of centralization, namely increased 
degree of competition and process streamlining, may deploy their full 
potential for the following reasons. 
Firstly, bundling separate procurement strategies into a single process 
will avoid repeating the same tasks and allow specialized personnel to 
check the tender documents more carefully, thus considerably reducing 
the risk of litigation at any stage of the procurement cycle. There exists, 
however, an additional benefit that normally goes unnoticed, namely the 
‚standardization of the procurement language‛, since different 
purchasing needs will be satisfied by relying on the same procedure. 
Standardization helps reduce barriers to entry into the procurement 
market, as firms will save on resources employed to check the differences 
among procurement strategies adopted by distinct contracting authorities, 
even if the latter end up purchasing similar commodities. 
Secondly, if several purchase orders (for commodities) are squeezed 
into the same contract, the contractor(s) is (are) likely to operate at much 
lower unit costs than the level that would be attainable when the overall 
value is split in many separate contracts. As mentioned in section 2.1, if 
the economies of scale and/or the higher bargaining power of the central 
procurement agency more than compensate for the potentially lower 
number of competing firms – due to more stringent economic/financial 
participation requirements – a centralized FC may trigger tighter 
competition and generate sizeable savings. 
One noticeable exception to the above line of reasoning may arise when 
the master contract does not refer to commodities such as gasoline, 
computers, or printers; rather, to services that require some specialized 
amount of human capital. This is the case of ‚general purpose" FCs for IT 
services awarded by Consip on behalf of the Italian Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEF), including a large variety of activities, from simple 
maintenance to developments of new applications, from software 
customization to integration of complex systems. Quality proposals 
consist in providing effective and flexible teams of professionals and 
technological solutions to best fit the various needs of the MEF. The 
                                                 
39 For instance, frame contracts awarded by Consip set both price and all the contractual 
clauses (but quantity and time of delivery of the single purchase orders). In addition, they 
never guarantee a minimum volume of purchases, rather establish an upper bound only. 
Thus the contractor bears all the uncertainty on the discrepancy between estimated and 
realized demand. 
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contractor is required to modify its working team to undertake a variety of 
tasks that will be precisely defined only after the ‚master‛ contract has 
been awarded. A risk then arises that the contract may resemble a sort of 
‚Pandora’s box‛ of heterogeneous services, generating high uncertainty 
when firms have to submit financial/technical proposals. 
Nevertheless, by its very nature, any (centralized) FC also risks to 
become an inflexible purchasing tool that may not fit many public 
agencies’ needs. So the higher the demand heterogeneity the more difficult 
to squeeze several purchase orders into the same FC. If demand 
aggregation is a bottom-up process, that is, if several public agencies 
explicitly delegate a centralized procurement agency (in fact, one of the 
public agencies may operate as such) then it should in principle be 
possible to determine in advance to what extent the same FC meets the 
needs of at least a fraction of final demand. Should demand aggregation 
be designed as a top-down process, that is, should a centralized 
procurement agency be entrusted with the mission of awarding FCs on 
behalf of public agencies, then some of the positive effects of centralization 
may be jeopardized if public agencies are not mandated to purchase 
through the same FC. In other words, if public agencies do have an 
‚outside option‛ to buy by themselves, competing firms run the risk that 
realized demand ends up being much lower than the pre-award 
conjectured level. High uncertainty is likely to raise submitted prices thus 
hampering the positive effect on savings due to firms exploiting 
economies of scale. 
Another major drawback of FCs originates from the risk of ‚adverse 
selection.‛ It is well known since Akerlof’s seminal contribution (Akerlof, 
1970) that trade in markets may break down when buyers cannot 
distinguish between high and low quality goods. Since buyers’ willingness 
to pay does not exceed the value of the ‚average quality‛ product, only 
sellers of low quality will be willing to trade. Anticipating this, rational 
buyers may refrain from purchasing altogether. A similar phenomenon 
may arise in centralized ‚ FCs‛. Since the same contractual clauses apply 
to all subsequent purchases, and public agencies may differ from each 
other with respect to one or more dimensions that ultimately affect 
contractor’s realized profit, the latter are bound to make offers based on 
the ‚public agencies’ average profile‛. Consequently, ‚bad‛ public 
agencies are more likely to issue purchase orders. 
Let us see the potentially harmful consequences of adverse selection in 
a stylized FC for car insurance. Suppose that public agencies differ with 
respect to the risk of accident of employees using cars for accomplishing 
their duties. Public agency ‚G‛ displays good accident records (low-risk), 
whereas public agency ‚B‛ displays very poor records (high-risk). 
Defining pG and pB the insurance premiums for low-risk and high-risk 
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drivers respectively, an insurance company would set pG < pB if it were 
able to make two separate offers. Requiring all conditions to be fixed, a FC 
would determine only one insurance premium. How would firms set the 
average insurance premium pA? The competitive level of pA is likely to 
depend, ceteris paribus, on whether the use of the FC is mandatory. If this is 
the case, and firms have sensible conjectures about the fraction of high-
risk public agencies, say, 60%, then competition would drive the premium 
to a level of pA = 0.6 pB + 0.4 pG. The resulting purchase orders give rise to 
social inefficiency since high-risk (resp. low-risk) agencies are paying too a 
low (resp. high-risk) insurance premium than the ones that would emerge 
from insurance companies negotiating directly and separately with public 
agencies. If, instead, the use of the FC is on a voluntary basis, then any 
‚average‛ insurance premium pA such that pG < pA < pB, would cause low-
risk public agencies to look for a better outside option. Rational profit-
maximizing firms will anticipate that only high-risk public agencies will 
purchase through the FC, thereby setting pA = pB. 
4.3 The Multi-award Incomplete Framework Agreements 
4.3.1 The Main Goal of Incomplete Framework Agreements 
Despite the formal classification into different ‚families‛ sketched in 
section 4.1, most public procurement practitioners use to think about FAs 
by implicitly referring to the ‚incomplete‛ FAs concluded with more than 
one economic operator. It is unsurprising, then, that they are identified by 
the Explanatory Note40 of the Directive issued by the European 
Commission as FAs strictu sensu. 
As discussed in the previous section, frame contracts allow public 
buyer(s) to reap most of the ‚classic‛ benefits of centralization, namely via 
tough competition, efficient use of specialization and knowledge sharing 
among the procurement officials, and minimization of the effort and 
process cost of the purchasing unit(s). On the other hand, ‚simple‛ 
purchasing contracts concluded through distinct and autonomous 
awarding procedures, while giving up such benefits, provide the 
contracting authorities with the maximum flexibility and possibility of 
customization and reduce the uncertainty faced by the competitors. 
Ideally, simple contracts also ensure allocative efficiency, in the sense that 
each contract will likely be served by the supplier who is the most efficient 
to do it. 
In this perspective, which ranks the different procurement strategies on 
the basis of the degree of standardization (or centralization), multi-award 
‚incomplete‛ FAs (or FAs strictu sensu) lay somewhere in between FCs 
                                                 
40 See note 36. 
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and simple contracts (Figure 1). This suggests that their main purpose 
should be to address the trade-off between demand aggregation and 
process efficiency on the one hand and customization, flexibility and 
allocative efficiency on the other one41. In other words, the main goal of 
incomplete FAs is to streamline the process for repeated purchases by 
providing a large amount of the overall required effort in the first selection 
round, while leaving some space for customization and further 
competition at the second stage, when the actual procurement needs arise 
and their specific features (quantities, delivery conditions, specific tasks to 
be undertaken, customizations requested) become better known. 
 
Figure 1 - The Nature of Framework Agreements is Determined by the Main Features 
of the Two Sides of the Market 
 
 
 
As mentioned above, such a mechanism typically turns out to be very 
useful in the case of a central purchasing agency concluding the 
agreement in order to define the basic qualitative features as well as 
upper-bound price conditions for contracts to be awarded by different and 
heterogeneous contracting authorities. This is the case, for instance, of the 
GSA Schedules in the US (accessible all US Federal Government agencies), 
of the FAs concluded by OGC Buying Solutions in the UK, and Hansel in 
Finland. In what follows, however, we will focus our attention to the case 
where the FA is concluded and all the specific contracts are awarded by 
one single contracting authority. 
                                                 
41 The trade-off between competition and efficiency in incomplete FAs is analyzed more 
formally by Albano and Sparro (2008) in a stylized two-stage model with horizontal 
differentiation. 
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4.3.2 The Two-stage Competition 
If the needs and/or the preferences of the contracting authority are 
somehow unknown or heterogeneous with respect to relevant aspects of 
the contracts to be awarded, it this then optimal to let these aspects to be 
defined through a second round of selection (the call-off stage). When 
actual needs arise, so that the uncertainty about the exact object and 
characteristics of a single specific contract is sensibly reduced, the 
selection is reopened and the operators part of the agreement are asked to 
precise and/or complete their first-stage offer. Thus, unlike FCs, the two-
stage procurement process consists of two distinct rounds of competition. 
In practice, let us consider the case of a process based on the 
Economically Most Advantageous Tender (EMAT) awarding criteria. In 
the most general case, at both stages offers are scored, ranked and selected 
on the basis of both price and technical sub-criteria, established in the 
tender documentation of the FA. Importantly, the offers submitted at the 
first stage cannot be substantially modified at the second stage42. A 
possible practical interpretation of this principle is that ‚core‛ or ‚basic‛ 
technical features of the supply/service have to be evaluated when 
concluding the FA and may not be successively modified. Competition 
can instead be reopened with respect to optional items/services, 
customizations or further improved qualitative features. As regards the 
financial offers, a commonly adopted rule is that prices submitted at the 
first stage can only be lowered at the call-off stage. 
Such a mechanism yields several strategic implications. Firstly, the 
suppliers may want to submit their best offers since from the first stage 
only with respect to the features of the contract that cannot be successively 
changed. On the contrary, they will possibly avoid to compete too 
aggressively on price, so as to offer the highest price that allows them to 
be selected at the first stage. In fact, this could allow them to exploit 
possible (technical) competitive advantage at the second stage and keep 
their profit high. Secondly, it is possible that some competitors aim at 
entering the agreement in order to serve one (or a few) specific contract(s) 
only. This could induce them to submit a very aggressive bid at the first 
stage while restraining from participating in some of the second-round 
competitive tendering, thus distorting the first-stage competition and 
hampering the efficiency of the whole mechanism. Both these issues can 
                                                 
42 In particular, the EU Directive 2004/18, in the Art. 32, states that ‚When awarding 
contracts based on a framework agreement, the parties may under no circumstances 
make substantial amendments to the terms laid down in that framework agreement‛. A 
possible rationale for this prescription is that substantial changes to the tenders at the 
call-off stage would represent a harmful distortion of the first-stage competition. 
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be found even in a very simple modelling of FAs, like the one, based on 
the lowest price criterion, in Albano and Sparro (2008). 
4.3.3 Balancing Competition 
The main message of this discussion is that the degree of heterogeneity 
between (or the degree of uncertainty about) the specific contracts plays a 
crucial role in the incentives provided to the potential competitors. As a 
consequence, from the point of view of the public entity designing and 
implementing the FA, the main issue to address is how to balance the 
competition between the two stages. Spurring competition at the first 
stage, de facto pushes a FA to end up more similar to a FC. On the contrary, 
when competition for selecting the operators part of the agreement is 
loose, the call-offs tend to become similar to independently run 
competitive tenders. It is then worth to discuss the main aspects in the 
design of the whole process which affect the balance of competition 
between the two stages. 
The first of such factors is the degree of completeness of the “master 
contract”, i.e. the relative fraction of the clauses of the specific contracts 
which are set since from the first round of competition and cannot be 
modified at the call-off stage. The higher the number of clauses of the 
specific contracts defined at the first stage the lower the degree of 
competition at the second stage with respect to the first one. 
In a FA awarded to the EMAT, when award criteria concern with a 
large share of the relevant terms of the supply contracts, then most of the 
overall score will be raffled at the first stage. Thus, at the call-off stage it 
will be harder, for the lower-ranked competitors who have entered the FA, 
to fill a gap of score arising from the first stage. This provides the 
suppliers to compete fiercely in order to enter the FA with a good score. 
On the other hand, an almost-complete master contract seems to be a 
suitable solution in cases where the degree of uncertainty or heterogeneity 
of the specific contracts is low, so limiting the risks from aggressive price 
bid since from the first stage. 
From a normative point of view, the buyer should then focus the initial 
round of selection on all the aspects of the supply/service which are likely 
to be common to all the specific contracts. Of course, a more complete 
master contract will require more effort for concluding the FA (e.g., in 
carefully estimating the future needs and in evaluating the submitted 
offers) while it will streamline the call-off processes. Though, it will 
streamline call-off processes. Though, this will limit the degree of 
flexibility. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that a more complete 
master contract maximizes benefits from centralization and demand 
aggregation. As a consequence, from the discussion carried out in section 
3, it follows that, when issues like innovation or sustainability are relevant 
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for the central purchasing agency concluding the FA, selection and award 
criteria related with such issues should also be adopted at the first, rather 
than at the second stage. 
The second key aspect affecting the balance of competition is the number 
of economic operators part of the agreement. This number can be either 
exogenous (i.e., predetermined in the tender documents drafted by the 
contracting authority managing the first stage) or endogenous (i.e., the 
agreement can involve all the operators whose tenders reach a 
predetermined quality and/or price threshold)43. The first option can be 
considered more useful when tight first stage competition is pursued by 
the contracting authority, or when limiting the number of operators part 
of the agreement is important in order to reduce the effort needed to 
evaluate the submitted tenders at the second stage. 
For a given number of potential competitors in the market, an 
exogenously fixed small number of winners induces higher competition at 
the first stage. Similarly, when the number of winners is endogenous, a 
similar effect is reached by setting higher the score threshold the 
competitors have to reach in order to enter the agreement. On the 
contrary, where the number of winners is high or the score threshold is 
low, competition will be focused on the call-off stage. 
Also, the number of competitors in the agreement should be high when 
the expected number of specific contracts as well as their potential 
heterogeneity is high too. In fact, allowing a marginal supplier to enter the 
agreement should result useful to the extent that she does have concrete 
chances to be awarded with some contract (or, similarly, to put 
competitive pressure on the other operators in the agreement). Where this 
is not the case, an higher number of operators just lowers the competition 
at the first stage while making the management of the call-offs more 
cumbersome. 
4.3.4 Dealing with the Risk of Collusion44 
Upon concluding a FA, a ‚new market‛ will emerge, characterized by 
two salient features: i) the number of firms will be, in general, lower than 
the set of competing firms at the first stage; ii) firms in the FA know that 
                                                 
43 This is typically the case for ‚open‛ Framework Agreements. A FA is open when new 
entrants can become part of the agreement at any time. Where this is the case, one cannot 
refer to a first round of competition, in the sense that true competition only takes place 
when awarding specific contracts. However, the present paper does not discuss this kind 
of FA. This is also because it lies outside the definition of FA provided by the EU 
Directive, which rather defines this mechanism Dynamic Purchasing System (adoptable 
for highly standardized commodities and through e-procurement platforms only). 
44 For a more general discussion on collusion in procurement markets, see Albano et al. 
(2006a). 
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they will be competing over time for a stream of purchase orders. When 
the FA does not allow entry of new firms at a later stage45, the resulting 
market will bear a straightforward resemblance with an oligopolistic 
market in which firms may be tempted by adopting collusive strategies, 
thus softening competition to raise profit. Coordination, whether explicit 
or tacit, is both tempting and feasible since firms interact over time. In 
oligopolistic markets it typically takes a rather simple form. Firms set a 
high price and keep it stable over time only if no-one undercuts its rivals 
at any point in time. Cheating is normally deterred by the threat of a 
possibly ever-lasting price war. 
In what follows, we will emphasize how the design of the FA and the 
stream of call-offs may increase the risk of collusion among firms. 
The sequence of call-offs could, in principle, be assimilated to a public 
contract split into several lots, the difference being that lots are awarded at 
different points in time. For a given number of firms in the FA and for a 
given overall value of the latter, the higher the number of call-offs the 
higher the risk of collusion since there will be a higher number of ‚pie-
sharing‛ arrangements to sustain a collusive scheme. One countermeasure 
would consist, whenever compatible with final demand, in lowering the 
number of call-offs (that is, reducing the frequency of interaction) by 
increasing the value of each call-off. This would reduce the number of 
potentially feasible collusive allocations. However, firms would be 
required to have higher financial/economic capacities, which would, in 
principle, reduce the number of competitors in the FA, thus making 
collusion more likely. 
When deciding whether to adhere to a collusive strategy, each firm 
needs to evaluate the net benefits from current deviations - namely, short-
run profit minus the expected cost arising from other firms' punishing 
strategies – against the present value of benefits from cooperation. The 
latter depends crucially on firms' ability to predict as precisely as possible 
the stream of call-offs. The more predictable the stream of call-offs the 
more confident firms will be on ‚how much collusion is worth‛. 
Consequently, preventing collusion might require not announcing in 
advance the precise stream of purchase orders that will take place in the 
FA. 
5 Conclusions 
The choice of the ‚optimal‛ degree of centralization in procurement is 
relevant both to private as well as public organizations. Unlike the former, 
however, the latter has to design procurement strategies by fulfilling a 
                                                 
45 This is in principle only feasible in a Dynamic Purchasing System. 
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higher number of requirements mainly due to legal constraints, to the 
nature of the services provided by public organizations and by low-power 
incentive constraints for procurement officers (and, more generally, for 
civil servants). Moreover, as we have emphasized in the first part of the 
current work, public procurement is being advocated as a potentially 
effective tool to promote other socially valuable goals such as innovation 
in markets and sustainable development. 
It then comes as no surprise that public procurement raises a variety of 
issues attracting scholars from different fields such as economics, law, 
computer science and operations research. Furthermore, casual 
observation seems to confirm that the practice of public procurement 
seems to be way ahead of research. This is in itself good news for 
academics since several puzzles are waiting to become full-fledged 
research programs. While resisting to the temptation of suggesting 
‚avenues‛ for future research, we wish to point to three, among the most 
compelling, lines of investigations. 
Firstly, international trade agreements (e.g. WTO) are increasingly 
recognizing the crucial role of public procurement regulation to open up 
local markets to international competition, thus creating equal access to 
procurement markets to both local and foreign firms. However, it is also 
argued that discriminatory procurement policies seem to be crucial for 
exploiting public procurement innovative potential. So, how to reconcile 
general principles of fairness and equality of treatment with the ‚need‛ of 
discrimination? 
Secondly, most economists tend to overemphasize the relevance of 
public procurement competitive tendering design. The simple reason 
being that the competitive phase can be thought of as an auction, so the 
machinery developed by auction theorists in the last 30 years apply almost 
straightforwardly. Unfortunately, this is far from being the case. Many 
procurement contracts specify lots of technical and financial aspects, 
renegotiation is frequently observed – especially in civil works – while 
some contingencies remain unregulated by contract clauses. This leads 
sometimes to a high complexity of the contract management phase that 
feeds back into the competitive phase due to the repeated nature of 
procurement. Most of the relevant problems in public procurement would 
remain unquestioned if research were to focus almost exclusively on the 
competitive tendering aspect. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most urgently, a more comprehensive and 
analytical approach to public procurement performance measures is in 
order. As policy guideline wiggle from value for money to social value for 
money, it becomes increasingly difficult to agree on reliable performance 
indicators, thus increasing the risk of leaving the assessment of public 
procurement strategies to merely subjective measures. 
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